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Lost Potential: International Treaty
Obligations and Juvenile Life Without
Parole in Edmonds v. State of Mississippi
Andrea Templetont
Introduction
Mississippi laws allow children1 to be tried in adult court. 2
Certain of these laws carry with them a mandatory sentence of life
without parole for "every person who shall be convicted of murder
....,3 On April 25, 2006, the Mississippi Court of Appeals upheld
such a punishment by affirming Tyler Edmonds's sentence of life
imprisonment without parole for a crime he committed at age
thirteen.4 On May 10, 2007, the Supreme Court of Mississippi
reversed and remanded the ruling to the Circuit Court of
Oktibbeha County, citing errors that resulted in a constitutionally
unfair trial. 5 The process by which Edmonds was originally
convicted and subsequently tried was deeply flawed for reasons in
addition to those considered by the court. The lack of accounting
for Edmonds's particular circumstances, namely his minor status,
violated standards set forth in at least three international treaties
to which the United States is a signatory.6 Similarly, procedural
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1. This article uses the terms "youth," "child," and "juvenile" interchangeably
to mean a person under the age of eighteen, which reflects common usage and the
Mississippi definition. See, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-21-105(d) (2006).
2. Edmonds v. State, 04-KA-02081-COA ( 92), 955 So. 2d 864, 894 (Miss. Ct.
App. 2006), rev'd en banc, 04-CT-02081-SCT, 955 So. 2d 787 (Miss. 2007).
3. MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-21 (2006); see also Edmonds, 04-KA-02081-COA (
95), 955 So. 2d at 895 ("This statute carries a mandatory sentence of life
imprisonment and allows the trial court no discretion once a conviction for murder
has been returned.").
4. Edmonds, 04-KA-02081-COA ( 4), 955 So. 2d at 869.
5. See Edmonds v. State, 04-CT-02081-SCT (T 2), 955 So. 2d 787, 790 (Miss.
2007).
6. See Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, Annex, at art.
37, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A144/49 (Nov. 20, 1989) (signed
by the United States on Feb. 16, 1995) [hereinafter Children's Convention];
Law and Inequality
issues regarding how Edmonds came to be tried in adult court and
the ramifications of such a harsh sentence on a young offender
speak to an emergent debate as to the justice of juvenile life
without parole. 7
This Comment illustrates the problems inherent in U.S. law
regarding sentencing juveniles to life without parole in light of
international consensus, focusing particularly on the State of
Mississippi in the Edmonds case. Part I of this Comment provides
an overview of international standards in the realm of juvenile
justice, illustrating provisions that relate directly to sentencing
juveniles in adult courts to life without parole. Part II provides a
description of the appellate court's analysis 8 and highlights
relevant aspects of the Mississippi Supreme Court's analysis
overturning that decision. 9 The Comment continues in Part III
with an analysis of the reasoning of both Mississippi courts, noting
areas where the circuit court, on remand, could benefit from
considering international standards. The Comment concludes by
calling on the Mississippi Legislature to give the judiciary more
discretion in the sentencing of juveniles, thereby recognizing an
evolving consensus toward taking age into account when
sentencing a juvenile to life without parole.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, arts. 10(3), 14(4), Mar. 23,
1976, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (signed by the United States on Oct. 5, 1977; ratified on
June 8, 1992) [hereinafter Civil and Political Covenant]; and American Declaration
of the Rights and Duties of Man, arts. I, VII, XXVI, XVIII, XXIV, XXV, XXVI, Ninth
Int'l Conference of Amer. States, Apr. 30, 1948, reprinted in Basic Documents
Pertaining to Human Rights in the Inter-American System, OEA/Ser.L.V/II.92 doc.
31 rev. 3 at 17 (May 3, 1996) [hereinafter American Declaration].
7. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL AND HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE REST OF
THEIR LIVES: LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE FOR CHILD OFFENDERS IN THE UNITED STATES
102-04 (2005), available at http://hrw.org/reports/2005/us1005/
TheRestofTheirLives.pdf [hereinafter AMNESTY REPORT] (documenting the use of
the sentence of life without parole for child offenders and the various legal
provisions it challenges); Steven Drizin & Allison McGowen Keegan, Abolishing the
Use of the Felony-Murder Rule when the Defendant Is a Teenager, 28 NOVA L. REV.
507, 527 (2004) (arguing against using the felony murder rule to sentence a juvenile
to life without parole); Bree Langemo, Serious Consequences for Serious Juvenile
Offenders: Do Juveniles Belong in Adult Courts?, 30 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 141, 142
(2004) (arguing against the transfer of juveniles to adult courts); Wayne A. Logan,
Proportionality and Punishment: Imposing Life Without Parole on Juveniles, 33
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 681, 684-85 (1998) (arguing that proportionality should be
taken into account when sentencing juveniles to life without parole); Paul
Morrissey, Do the Adult Crime, Do the Adult Time: Due Process and Cruel and
Unusual Implications for a 13-Year-Old Sex Offender Sentenced to Life
Imprisonment in State v. Green, 44 VILL. L. REV. 707, 709 (1999) (analyzing the
constitutionality of sentencing children to life without parole).
8. Edmonds, 04-KA-02081-COA, 955 So. 2d 864.
9. Edmonds, 04-CT-02081-SCT, 955 So. 2d 787.
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I. With Reservations: Juvenile Offenders Under U.S. and
International Law
Currently, the federal government and forty-two states allow
sentencing of juveniles to life without parole.10 This Section
begins by looking at the relevant, domestic sentencing laws and
continues with an enumeration of relevant international treaty
obligations.
A. Juvenile Offenders Under Domestic Law
1. State Law
Under Mississippi law, "[e]very person who shall be convicted
of murder shall be sentenced by the court to imprisonment for life
in the State Penitentiary."11  Mississippi law also gives original
jurisdiction to the state circuit court for "[a]ny act attempted or
committed by a child, which if committed by an adult would be
punishable under state or federal law by life imprisonment or
death .... -12 Transfer to youth court is allowed at the circuit
court's discretion as follows:
In any case wherein the defendant is a child as defined in this
chapter 13 and of which the circuit court has original
jurisdiction, the circuit judge, upon a finding that it would be
in the best interest of such child and in the interest of justice,
may at any stage of the proceedings prior to the attachment of
jeopardy transfer such proceedings to the youth court for
further proceedings .... If the case is not transferred to the
youth court and the youth is convicted of a crime by any circuit
court, the trial judge shall sentence the youth as though such
youth was an adult. 14
However, such a transfer is far from mandatory and depends on a
determination of what is "in the best interest of such child and in
the interest of justice."15
U.S. state courts vary widely in their interpretations of the
Eighth Amendment as applied to life without parole for juveniles.
Some state courts have upheld the constitutionality of juvenile life
10. AMNESTY REPORT, supra note 7, at 18.
11. MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-21 (2006).
12. MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-21-151(1)(a) (2006). Section 43, chapter 21 of the
Mississippi Code is known as the "Youth Court Law." § 43-21-101. It is also
referred to as the "Youth Court Act." See, e.g., Edmonds, 04-CT-02081-SCT ( 55-
57), 955 So. 2d at 804-05 (Diaz, P.J., specially concurring).
13. See MIss. CODE ANN. § 43-21-105(d) (defining a child as "a person who has
not reached his eighteenth birthday").
14. MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-21-159(4).
15. Id.
2008]
Law and Inequality [Vol. 26:233
without parole. 16 At least one court found life without parole
unconstitutional when applied to child offenders, 17 and the Kansas
Legislature ruled that life without parole disproportionately
punishes minor offenders.18 Other state courts have allowed for
the possibility of parole when children have effectively been
sentenced to life in prison. 19 Scholarly discussion of legislative
responses to juvenile crime and the efficacy of harsh punishment
for youth violence also adds to the debate about moral consensus. 20
This debate challenges procedural mechanisms allowing children
to be tried in adult court-a typical legislative response to
increasing youth violence. 21 Such a system, if abused, can lead to
ineffective and overly harsh punishments. 22
16. See, e.g., State v. Pilcher, 27,085 (La. App. 2 Cir. 5/10/95); 655 So. 2d 636,
643-44 (La. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that a life sentence without possibility of parole
for a fifteen-year-old murderer was not unconstitutional under the Eighth
Amendment); Swinford v. State, 653 So. 2d 912, 918 (Miss. 1995) (upholding trial
court's sentence of life imprisonment for a fourteen-year-old who aided and abetted
murder); White v. State, 374 So. 2d 843, 847 (Miss. 1979) (upholding a sixteen-
year-old child's sentence of life imprisonment without parole for armed robbery
against the assertion that it was cruel and unusual punishment).
17. See Naovarath v. State, 779 P.2d 944, 948-49 (Nev. 1989) (holding that the
sentence of life without parole constituted "cruel and unusual punishment for a
mentally and emotionally disordered thirteen-year-old child" convicted of murder).
18. See John L. Patterson, Alternative Penalty, KANSAS CITY STAR (Mo.), Feb. 9,
2004, at B1 (writing about the Kansas Legislature's exemption of child offenders
from a new bill substituting life without parole for the death penalty).
19. See People v. Miller, 781 N.E.2d 300, 303 (Ill. 2002) (affirming the reduction
of a fifteen-year-old child's mandatory sentence of life due to the unconscionability
of sentencing a child with "greater rehabilitative potential" than an adult to life
without parole); Trowbridge v. State, 717 N.E.2d 138, 150 (Ind. 1999) (holding
consideration of age consistent with an Indiana statute prohibiting life without
parole sentences for youth under sixteen). Indiana law provides that a child under
the age of sixteen who commits murder cannot be sentenced to death or life
imprisonment without parole. IND. CODE § 35-50-2-3(b) (2004).
20. See, e.g., Samuel Marion Davis, The Criminalization of Juvenile Justice:
Legislative Responses to 'The Phantom Menace," 70 MISS. L.J. 1 (2000) (examining
the trend toward increased adult treatment of juveniles and proposing safeguards
against potential abuse of the prosecutorial function); Barry C. Feld, Juvenile and
Criminal Justice Systems' Responses to Youth Violence, 24 CRIME & JUST. 189
(1998) (proposing a sentencing policy framework that provides a graduated system
of criminal sentencing consistent with the developmental continuum by recognizing
youthfulness as a mitigating factor); Victor L. Streib, The Efficacy of Harsh
Punishments for Teenage Violence, 31 VAL. U. L. REV. 427 (1997) (advocating a
community focus for a long-term solution to juvenile violence).
21. See generally Feld, supra note 20. Feld notes that during the 1990s "nearly
every state . . . amended its juvenile code in response to perceived increases in
serious, persistent, and violent youth crime." Id. at 189.
22. See id. (noting that the focus on accountability and lack of mitigation based
on youth leads to disproportionate punishment of juveniles).
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2. Federal Law
At least two provisions of the U.S. Constitution are at odds
with sentencing juveniles to life without parole: the Eighth
Amendment ban on cruel and unusual punishment 23 and the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 24 Since a state
sentencing provision will not be upheld if it is found to violate the
U.S. Constitution, 25  an analysis of constitutional standards
provides relevant background to the Edmonds case.
Juvenile life sentences without the possibility of parole have
been upheld against challenges that they are cruel and unusual
punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. 26 Such cases
note that the serious nature of the offense establishes a need for a
strict sentence, 27 or they comment on the absence of a societal
consensus against such a sentence. 28 The U.S. Supreme Court
23. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII ("Excessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.").
24. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law .... ").
25. The Fourteenth Amendment requires:
No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive
any person of life, liberty or property, without due process of law; nor deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 559-60
(2005) (holding that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments forbid the imposition
of the death penalty on offenders who were under eighteen when the crime was
committed).
26. See, e.g., Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 996 (1991) (holding that
imposition of mandatory sentence of life in prison without possibility of parole,
without any consideration of mitigating factors, did not constitute cruel and
unusual punishment); Harris v. Wright, 93 F.3d 581, 583-85 (9th Cir. 1996)
(holding that the sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of parole
imposed on a fifteen-year-old defendant convicted of murder was not
disproportionate to the offense in violation of the Eighth Amendment); People v.
Launsburry, 551 N.W.2d 460, 464 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that a mandatory
life sentence without parole for a juvenile convicted of first-degree murder was not
cruel and unusual punishment); Laird v. State, 933 S.W.2d 707, 714-15 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1996) (holding that a statute mandating a life sentence for juveniles certified
as adults and convicted of capital murder is not "unconstitutional for failure to
avoid arbitrary and capricious infliction of punishment" or "for failure to avoid
cruel and unusual punishment" and finding that the statute considers youth in
mitigation of death penalty, which is the only other option besides a life sentence,
in sentencing an adult defendant so convicted).
27. See, e.g., Launsburry, 551 N.W.2d at 463 (noting that "murder is a serious
offense" and that the punishment of mandatory life imprisonment without parole
"has been held to be proportionate to the offense" in this case).
28. See, e.g., Hawkins v. Hargett, 200 F.3d 1279, 1285 (10th Cir. 1999) (holding
that there is "apparently no societal consensus that a long sentence imposed on a
defendant for serious crimes he committed at age thirteen offends evolving
standards of decency"). But see Workman v. Commonwealth, 429 S.W.2d 374, 378
(Ky. 1968) (holding that the penalty of life imprisonment without benefit of parole
Law and Inequality [Vol. 26:233
stated in Harmelin v. Michigan that "the Eighth Amendment
contains no proportionality guarantee."29 American Jurisprudence
cites only one case where such a sentence was held cruel and
unusual due to its disproportionate nature, and that case was
vacated. 30 Even so, critics of juvenile life without parole argue
that a proportionality analysis should apply to sentencing of
children because of differences in culpability between minors and
adults. 31
Arguments regarding the diminished competency and
culpability of children led to international prohibitions on both the
death penalty and sentences of life imprisonment without parole. 32
The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that the final and most
important standard for determining whether a punishment is
cruel and unusual is whether it is so disproportionate that it goes
against "the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress
of a maturing society."3 3 In Roper v. Simmons,34 the most recent
Supreme Court case involving criminal punishment of juveniles, 35
is cruel and unusual punishment and "shocks the general conscience of society
today" when applied to juvenile offenders).
29. See Harmelin, 501 U.S. 957, 965 (1991). However, the fractured holding of
Harmelin leads to questions as to whether proportionality really has no place in
sentencing or whether its role is simply diminished. See generally Logan, supra
note 7 (discussing proportionality and punishment as it relates to life without
parole sentencing against juveniles).
30. 21A AM. JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 974 (2d ed. 2006). The case cited was
vacated on rehearing, removing any precedential value. See Rummel v. Estelle,
568 F.2d 1193 (5th Cir. 1978), vacated on reh'g, 587 F.2d 651 (5th Cir. 1978), a/ffd,
445 U.S. 263 (1980).
31. See Logan, supra note 7, at 709.
32. See Civil and Political Covenant, supra note 6; Children's Convention,
supra note 6; infra Part I.B.2; see also Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 623 (2005)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[I]n addition to barring the execution of under-18
offenders, the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child prohibits
punishing them with life in prison without the possibility of release. If we are truly
going to get in line with the international community, then the Court's reassurance
that the death penalty is really not needed, since 'the punishment of life
imprisonment without the possibility of parole is itself a severe sanction' . . . gives
little comfort." (quoting the majority opinion at 572)); AMNESTY REPORT, supra note
7, at 86-87 (highlighting court findings of differences between adults and youth in
courts and crime).
33. Roper, 543 U.S. at 561 (citing Trop v. Dules, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958)
(plurality opinion)).
34. 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
35. Earlier cases include Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 587
(2001) (Thomas, J., concurring) (finding that children "lack the judgment to make
an intelligent decision about whether to smoke"), Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S.
815, 835 (1988) (concluding that "less culpability should attach to a crime
committed by a juvenile than to a comparable crime committed by an adult"), and
Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979) (holding that children have no due process
rights to notice and a judicial hearing before being committed by their parents to a
238
LOST POTENTIAL
the Court struck down the juvenile death penalty in light of an
evolving national standard among state sentencing guidelines
against the juvenile death penalty. 36 Likewise, legal analysts note
that the diminished competency and culpability that led to the
prohibition of the death penalty for minors could equally apply to a
prohibition of juvenile life without parole. 37 The state procedures
discussed above in Part I.A.1 are inconsistent with an evolving
moral consensus against life without parole.
3. Scholarly and Judicial Debate
Commentators attack the procedures involved with
sentencing juveniles to life without parole, arguing that these
procedures violate juveniles' constitutional right to due process. 38
Human rights advocates are specifically concerned with waivers
and automatic transfers of youth offenders into adult court, which
leave children susceptible to mandatory life without parole for
crimes of murder 39 or felony murder. 40 Critics cite psychological
and societal differences as major reasons why children should not
be sentenced in adult courts: children have a reduced ability to
make reasoned decisions 4 1 and the stresses and procedures of
adult courts are magnified when applied to child offenders. 42 In
contrast, some judges argue that legislatures, not courts, bear the
mental institution).
36. Roper, 543 U.S. at 561. Evolving standards of moral decency were also used
to strike down the death penalty for prisoners with mental retardation in Atkins v.
Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 (2002).
37. See Barry C. Feld, Competence, Culpability and Punishment: Implications
of Atkins for Executing and Sentencing Adolescents, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 463, 544
(2003); Julie Rowe, Mourning the Untimely Death of the Juvenile Death Penalty: An
Examination of Roper v. Simmons and the Future of the Juvenile Justice System, 42
CAL. W. L. REV. 287, 317 (2006).
38. See AMNESTY REPORT, supra note 7; Drizin & Keegan, supra note 7, at 534-
42; Langemo, supra note 7; Morrissey, supra note 7; see also Richard Rosenbaum,
Child's Play No Longer: Children Charged and Tried as Adults in Florida-Ending
Up in Prison for Life Without Parole, 28 NOVA L. REV. 485 (2004) (arguing Florida's
"juvenile transfer statutes" are facially unconstitutional).
39. See, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 43-21-151(1)(a), 97-3-21 (2004) (granting
jurisdiction to the circuit court in cases where the act committed by the youth is
punishable by life imprisonment and sentencing anyone convicted of murder to life
imprisonment).
40. See Drizen & Keegan, supra note 7.
41. "According to many psychologists, adolescents are less able than adults to
perceive and understand the long-term consequences of their acts, to think
autonomously instead of bending to peer pressure or the influence of older friends
and acquaintances, and to control their emotions and act rationally instead of
impulsively." AMNESTY REPORT, supra note 7, at 45.
42. See Rosenbaum, supra note 38, at 498-99 (arguing that very young
defendants should be presumed incompetent for trial in adult court).
2008]
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responsibility of addressing criminal sentencing. 43  Other
justifications for juvenile life without parole include the significant
brutality of certain crimes 44 and the idea that children should do
the "adult time" for the "adult crime." 45
B. Juvenile Offenders Under International Law
Treaty obligations assumed by the United States are
incorporated into U.S. law by the Supremacy Clause of the U.S.
Constitution, which states "all treaties made, or which shall be
made, under the Authority of the United States shall be the
supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be
bound thereby." 46 In addition to treaty obligations, U.S. courts are
bound by the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court, which has
recently accepted international standards as persuasive authority
when deciding how to treat death penalty sentencing of juveniles 47
and persons with mental retardation.48 Studies highlighting the
adverse effects of life without parole on juvenile offenders invoke
widespread international legal consensus against the sentence. 49
These studies also suggest that the United States is increasingly
isolated in its treatment of juveniles when compared to the rest of
the developed world and most of the developing world. 50 Only
fourteen countries allow life without parole for juvenile offenders,
and only four of them (including the United States) have child
43. See, e.g., Edmonds v. State, 04-KA-02081-COA ( 97), 955 So. 2d 864, 895
(Miss. Ct. App. 2006), rev'd en banc, 04-CT-02081-SCT, 955 So. 2d 787 (Miss. 2007).
But see AMNESTY REPORT, supra note 7, at 90-92 (illustrating examples of judges
who feel constrained by legislated, mandatory, sentencing guidelines imposing
harsher punishments on juveniles).
44. See, e.g., People v. Ortiz, 67 Cal. Rptr. 2d 126 (Ct. App. 1997) (holding a
sentence of twenty-six years to life for a fourteen-year-old is justified by the
brutality of the crime).
45. Morrissey, supra note 7, at 707.
46. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
47. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (holding the death penalty to be
unconstitutional when applied to juveniles under the age of eighteen).
48. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (holding that execution of
criminals with mental retardation constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under
the Eighth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution).
49. See U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Comm'n on Human Rights,
Rights of the Child, 8, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2006JNGO/86 (Feb. 28, 2006) (submitted
by Human Rights Advocates), available at http://www.humanrightsadvocates.org/
images/HRAStatement4_2006.pdf [hereinafter Rights of the Child] (noting that
132 countries reject the sentence of juvenile life without parole completely and that
the ratification of the Convention on the Rights of the Child by all world countries
except the United States and Somalia points to an internationally recognized, jus
cogens norm against sentencing children to life without parole).
50. See AMNESTY REPORT, supra note 7, at 94-109.
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offenders serving time. 51 While there are currently 2,225 children
sentenced to life in prison without parole in the United States,
there are only thirteen children serving this sentence in all other
countries combined. 52
Three major treaties enumerate international standards for
the treatment of juveniles: the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights ("Civil and Political Covenant"), 53 the
American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man ("American
Declaration"), 54 and the Convention on the Rights of the Child
("Children's Convention"). 55
The United States became a party to the Civil and Political
Covenant in 1992,56 assuming the obligations thereunder. Article
14 requires that criminal procedures, in dealing with juveniles,
"take account of their age and the desirability of promoting their
rehabilitation,"5 7 which is impossible with certain mandatory
sentencing procedures.58 Sentencing children in adult courts also
violates Article 10 of the Civil and Political Covenant, which
requires separation of child offenders from adults 59  and
penitentiary treatment appropriate to age and legal status. 60 In
ratifying the Civil and Political Covenant, the United States filed
a reservation 61 stating:
51. The fourteen countries known to permit sentencing of child offenders to life
without parole are: Antigua and Barbuda, Australia, Brunei, Burkina Faso, Cuba,
Dominica, Israel, Kenya, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, the Solomon Islands,
South Africa, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, and the United States. See Rights of the Child,
supra note 49, at 8-10. Of these countries, South Africa has five children
serving this sentence, Israel has seven, and Tanzania has one. Id. at 11-12.
52. Id.
53. Civil and Political Covenant, supra note 6.
54. American Declaration, supra note 6.
55. Children's Convention, supra note 6.
56. See UNITED NATIONS, MULTILATERAL TREATIES DEPOSITED WITH THE
SECRETARY-GENERAL, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, at 190,
U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.E/25, U.N. Sales No. E.07.V.3 (2007), available at
http://www.ohchr.org/english/countries/ratification/4.htm (last updated July 30,
2007) [hereinafter U.S. Reservation - Civil and Political Covenant].
57. Civil and Political Covenant, supra note 6, at art. 14(4).
58. See discussion infra Part III.B.
59. Civil and Political Covenant, supra note 6, at art. 10(2)(b) ("Accused
juvenile persons shall be separated from adults and brought as speedily as possible
for adjudication.").
60. Id. at art. 10(3) ("Juvenile offenders shall be segregated from adults and be
accorded treatment appropriate to their age and legal status."); see also id. at art.
24(1) ("Every child shall have, without any discrimination . . . the right to such
measures of protection as are required by his status as a minor, on the part of his
family, society and the State.").
61. As defined in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, a "reservation"
is "a unilateral statement, however phrased or named, made by a State, when
Law and Inequality
The policy and practice of the United States are generally in
compliance with and supportive of the Covenant's provisions
regarding treatment of juveniles in the criminal justice
system. Nevertheless, the United States reserves the right, in
exceptional circumstances, to treat juveniles as adults,
notwithstanding paragraphs 2(b) and 3 of article 10 and
paragraph 4 of article 14.62
Given the widespread sentencing of juveniles to life without parole
in the United States, 63 the United States has stretched the
exceptional circumstances provision 64 beyond its meaning.
By ratifying the Civil and Political Covenant, the United
States agreed to report periodically on "measures [it has] adopted
which give effect to the rights recognized [under the covenant] and
the progress made in enjoyment of those rights."65 Responsibility
for oversight of this reporting falls to the United Nations' Human
Rights Committee, 66 a body of experts elected by the participating
states.67  In its recent concluding observations, following the
combined second and third reports of the United States on its
compliance with the Civil and Political Covenant, the Committee
noted with concern that the current practice of sentencing youth to
life without parole puts the United States in violation of the
treaty, notwithstanding the United States' reservation. 68 The
Committee cited the large numbers of youth offenders serving life
sentences in U.S. prisons and the fact that the vast majority of
states allow persons under the age of eighteen at the time the
offense is committed to receive life sentences without parole, as
signing, ratifying, accepting, approving, or acceding to a treaty, whereby it purports
to exclude or to modify the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty in their
application to that State." Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 2, opened
for signature May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
62. U.S. Reservation - Civil and Political Covenant, supra note 56.
63. See Rights of the Child, supra note 49, at I 10-12; supra notes 25-28 and
accompanying text.
64. See U.S. Reservation - Civil and Political Covenant, supra note 56.
65. Civil and Political Covenant, supra note 6, at art. 40.
66. Id. at art. 28. "States ... undertake to submit reports on measures they
have adopted which give effect to the rights recognized herein and the progress
made in the enjoyment of those rights .... ." Id. at art. 40. The United States
submitted a combined second and third report to the Committee in December 2005.
See U.N. Human Rights Comm., Consideration of Reports Submitted by States
Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant: United States of America, U.N. Doc
CCPR/C/USAI3 (Nov. 28, 2005).
67. Civil and Political Covenant, supra note 6, at arts. 28-34.
68. See supra text accompanying note 62; see also U.N. Human Rights Comm.,
Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 40 of the
Covenant: Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee, United States




evidence that the United States applies this sentence routinely,
rather than only in exceptional circumstances. 69 The Committee
further noted that this practice violates the Civil and Political
Covenant Article 10(2)(b) (speedy adjudication for juveniles),
Article 10(3) (age appropriate treatment), Article 14(4)
(rehabilitation of juveniles), and Article 24(1) (special protection of
minors). 70
The United States is also a party to the American
Declaration, 71 the signatory document of the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights. The American Declaration states
that children have a right to special protection, 72 which the
Commission has held to include a requirement that a State "make
substantial efforts to guarantee [minors'] rehabilitation in order to
'allow them to play a constructive and productive role in
society."' 73  The interpretative mandate of the American
Declaration encourages the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights to construe the Declaration in light of other
international treaties and instruments as well as customary
international law relative to the rights of the child, 74 most notably
the Children's Convention.
The third major treaty to address the issue is the Children's
Convention 75-by far the most comprehensive convention in the
realm of children's rights. While the United States has signed, but
not ratified, this convention, 76 some imply that the country should
adhere to the principles. 77 Other than the United States and
69. Concluding Observations, supra note 68.
70. See supra notes 57-60 and accompanying text.
71. American Declaration, supra note 6, at art. VII.
72. Id.
73. Domingues v. United States, Case 12.285, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No.
62/02, doc. 5 rev. 83 (citing Villagran Morales v. Guatemala (Street Children
Case), Judgment of Nov. 19, 1999, Annual Report 1999, 197), available at
http://iachr.org/annualrep/2002engfUSA.12285.htm; see Petition Alleging Violations
of the Human Rights of Juveniles Sentenced to Life Without Parole in the United
States of America at 24 (Inter-Am. C.H.R. Feb. 21, 2006), available at
http://www.aclu.org/images/assetupload.file326_24232.pdf [hereinafter ACLU
Petition].
74. See ACLU Petition, supra note 73, at 24.
75. Children's Convention, supra note 6.
76. The United States signed the Children's Convention on February 16, 1995.
See AMNESTY REPORT, supra note 7, at 99. In addition, the United States has
accepted the Declaration on the Rights of the Child, which also espouses special
protection for children. See Declaration on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res.
1386/XIV, U.N. GAOR, 14th Sess., U.N. Doc NRO/142/09 (Nov. 20, 1959).
77. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 623 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(implying that to truly "get in line with the international community" the United
States would have to adhere to the Children's Convention's prohibition on
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Somalia, every country in the world (192 of 194) has accepted the
Children's Convention; none of the parties have registered a
reservation to the convention's prohibition on life without parole. 78
Relevant provisions of this convention include the following:
prohibiting capital punishment and life imprisonment without
possibility of release for persons below eighteen years of age, 79
using incarceration only as "a measure of last resort and for the
shortest appropriate period of time,"8 0 taking into account a child's
age and the desirability of "promoting the child's reintegration"
into society,81 and allowing a child to "challenge the legality of the
deprivation of his or her liberty."8 2
II. Edmonds v. State of Mississippi: Classic Characteristics
of a Juvenile Sentenced to Life Imprisonment Without
Parole
The Edmonds facts offer a distressing illustration of juvenile
crime. At age thirteen, defendant Tyler Edmonds was accused of
shooting his half-sister's husband.8 3 After the alleged shooting,
Edmonds reportedly left town with his half-sister Kristi,8 4 then
returned later and went to the police station with his mother,
where he signed a Miranda statement and gave a videotaped
confession of the crime.8 5 Edmonds's mother was not permitted in
the room when he confessed,8 6 and the law enforcement officials
sentencing youth to life without parole); see also Lainie Rutkow & Joshua T.
Lozman, Suffer the Children?: A Call for United States Ratification of the United
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, 19 HARv. HUM. RTS. J. 161, 170-72
(2006) (discussing measures introduced in Congress during the 1990s calling for
the United States to ratify the Convention).
78. See UNITED NATIONS, MULTILATERAL TREATIES DEPOSITED WITH THE
SECRETARY-GENERAL, Convention on the Rights of the Child, at 327, U.N. Doc.
ST/LEG/SER.E/25, U.N. Sales No. E.07.V.3 (2007), available at
http://www.ohchr.org/english/countries/ratification/lI.htm (last updated July 13,
2007). The majority in Roper v. Simmons noted specially the fact that no State
party to the Children's Convention had made a reservation to the prohibition
against the juvenile death penalty contained in Article 37. Roper, 543 U.S. at 576;
see also AMNESTY REPORT, supra note 7, at 99.
79. Children's Convention, supra note 6, at art. 37(a) ("Neither capital
punishment nor life imprisonment without possibility of release shall be imposed
for offences committed by persons below eighteen years of age.").
80. Id. at art. 37(b).
81. Id. at art. 40.1.
82. Id. at art. 37(d).
83. See Edmonds v. State, 04-CT-02081-SCT ( 2-4), 955 So. 2d 787, 790
(Miss. 2007).
84. Id. at ( 3), 955 So. 2d at 790-91.
85. Id. at ($ 51), 955 So. 2d at 791.
86. Id.
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did not videotape his initial custodial interrogation.8 7 The trial
court subsequently sentenced Edmonds to life imprisonment
without parole.88 This Section analyzes several holdings of the
appellate and supreme courts, all of which are relevant to the
sentencing of children to life without parole. Since the reasoning
of the Mississippi Supreme Court's majority opinion does not focus
on the same issues as that of the state appellate court, both
opinions are discussed.
A. Pre-Trial Procedural Issues: Voluntariness of Confession
and Treatment of Juvenile Status
The Edmonds appellate court began addressing procedure in
several separate holdings. One holding addressed whether
Edmonds's confession should have been admitted into evidence in
the first place.8 9 A second holding focused on whether, because
Edmonds was a juvenile, jurors should have been given a
cautionary instruction regarding the voluntariness of the
confession. 90 In a third holding, the court wrestled with jury
instructions in light of Edmonds's age and the possible sentence of
life without parole. 9 1
Edmonds, in his appeal, argued that "his age, his lack of
experience with law enforcement interrogation, the removal of his
mother from the room during the interrogation, and the fact that
the police officers allegedly used Kristi to pressure him into
confessing caused his confession to be unreliable, involuntary, and
inadmissible." 92 During a suppression hearing, the trial court
concluded that the totality of the circumstances and prior
precedent gave no basis to conclude that Edmonds's confession
"was not voluntarily and intelligently given," and the appellate
court found no error in admitting the confession. 93 The court
noted specifically that there was no testimony of either Edmonds
or his mother asking for an attorney or for an end to the
interrogation, 94 that both parties signed a Miranda waiver, 95 and
that the prior precedent gave no weight to having different
87. Edmonds v. State, 04-KA-02081-COA (7 23), 955 So. 2d 864, 876 (Miss. Ct.
App. 2006), rev'd en banc, 04-C7-02081-SC7, 955 So. 2d 787 (Miss. 2007).
88. Id. at ( 2), 955 So. 2d at 867.
89. Id. at (7 16-23), 955 So. 2d at 874-75.
90. Id. at ( 99-104), 955 So. 2d at 895-97.
91. Id. at ( 86-90), 955 So. 2d at 893-94.
92. Id. at (T 16), 955 So. 2d at 874.
93. Id. at (1 18), 955 So. 2d at 875.




standards for a youth in adult court. 96
The court of appeals also commented on an amicus brief filed
by the Center on Wrongful Conviction and the Innocence Project
New Orleans arguing for two new per se rules: an exclusion of
"any statement taken from a minor outside the presence of his
parents" and a requirement that "law enforcement record the
entire custodial interrogation of a minor."97 The court did not rule
on the effectiveness of the proposed rules, but pointed out that any
changes regarding the court's jurisdiction of cases must come from
the Mississippi Legislature. 98 Ultimately, the court held that the
confession was admissible. 99
The Mississippi Supreme Court did not address the
voluntariness of Edmonds's confession in its majority opinion
beyond affirming the appellate court's decision regarding
admissibility of expert testimony. 00 Even so, the topic is covered
in the specially concurring opinion of Presiding Justice Diaz 01 and
the specially concurring opinion of Justice Randolph. 0 2 Justice
Randolph's concurrence states that Edmonds's confession was
properly admitted due to the shortage of evidence of police or
prosecutorial misconduct and the lack of legal requirement for the
presence of Edmonds's mother during the interrogation. 0 3 In
contrast, Presiding Justice Diaz put forth several strong
arguments for error in admitting Edmonds's confession. First,
Edmonds showed a lack of understanding of what it meant to give
a confession. 1° 4  Second, the confession was obtained before
Edmonds had been charged with murder and was thus in violation
of the Youth Court Act. i05 Third, reasonable doubt existed as to
96. Id. at (1 18), 955 So. 2d at 875. Further in the opinion, the court notes that
a youth's confession does not receive the same suspicion as that of an accomplice or
a co-defendant. Id. at ( 100), 955 So. 2d at 896.
97. Id. at (1 23), 955 So. 2d at 877.
98. Id.
99. Id. at ( 22), 955 So. 2d at 877.
100. Edmonds v. State, 04-CT-02081-SCT (1 6), 955 So. 2d 787, 791 (Miss. 2007).
101. Id. at ($ 36-45), 955 So. 2d at 799-800 (Diaz, P.J., specially concurring)
(discussing false confessions).
102. Id. at ($ 79-99), 955 So. 2d at 811-17 (Randolph, J., specially concurring).
103. Id.
104. Id. at ( 52), 955 So. 2d at 803 (Diaz, P.J., specially concurring).
105. Id. at (77 55-57), 955 So. 2d at 804-05; see MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-21-303(3)
(2006) (requiring the presence of a parent during the interrogation for a minor).
But see Edmonds, 04-CT-02081-SCT (1 95), 955 So. 2d at 816 (Randolph, J.,
specially concurring) (arguing that the Youth Court Act is inapplicable to
Edmonds's case because "every relevant individual" recognized that the Sheriffs
department was investigating a murder, which "plainly fits within the
jurisdictional purview of the circuit court, not the youth court").
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the voluntariness of the confession, due to circumstances
regarding Edmonds's age and his inexperience with law
enforcement. 106 Noting that the Mississippi Supreme Court must
take into account factors unique to children if a juvenile has
waived rights away, 107 Presiding Justice Diaz highlighted that
"signing a waiver does not automatically make the subsequent
statements voluntary, knowing, or intelligent," and challenged the
circuit and appeals courts' reliance on a waiver to prove
Edmonds's confession was voluntary. 108
In addition to looking at the voluntariness of Edmonds's
confession, the court of appeals wrestled with several issues
regarding jury instructions at Edmonds's trial. One relevant
holding denied the defense's request to provide the jury with an
instruction to treat juvenile confessions with caution. 109 The court
discussed the origin of such an instruction"0 and its focus on
viewing the voluntariness of such confessions by juveniles with
extra caution."' Ultimately, the court decided that its own
precedent did not make refusing to give a cautionary statement
reversible error. 112 The court, citing "clear legislative intent" that
a juvenile's testimony not be viewed with the same suspicion as an
accomplice or co-defendant's testimony, 113 declined "to offer
juveniles prosecuted as adults the additional precaution of an
instruction urging the jury to treat [them] specially simply
because," of their minority statuses. 114
Edmonds also claimed that he should have been permitted to
inform the jury that he would receive a mandatory life sentence if
convicted of murder. 115 The court stated its interpretation of
Edmonds's argument to be that "the jurors might have been
misled into believing that, due to his age, he could receive a
sentence less than life." 116 The court concluded that Mississippi
106. Edmonds, 04-CT-02081-SCT ($ 63), 955 So. 2d at 807 (Diaz, P.J., specially
concurring).
107. Id. at (1 61), 955 So. 2d at 806.
108. Id. at ( 65), 955 So. 2d at 807-08.
109. Edmonds v. State, 04-KA-02081-COA ( 9 99-104), 955 So. 2d 864, 895-96
(Miss. Ct. App. 2006), reud en banc, 2004-C7-2081-SC7, 955 So. 2d 787 (Miss.
2007).
110. Id. at (T 101), 955 So. 2d at 896 (citing In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 52 (1967)).
111. Id.
112. Id. at (T 103), 955 So. 2d at 896 (citing Bandy v. State, 495 So. 2d 486, 493
(Miss. 1986)).
113. Id. at (9 104), 955 So. 2d at 897.
114. Id.
115. Id. at ( 86), 955 So. 2d at 893.
116. Id. at (1 86), 955 So. 2d at 894.
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law forbids one from arguing about a possible sentence for a
defendant in front of a jury 17 and noted that informing a jury of
possible sentences would only incite error, because a jury does not
control sentencing. 1 18
The majority opinion of the Mississippi Supreme Court ruling
did not address potential jury errors. However, in his special
concurrence, Presiding Justice Diaz noted that the trial judge
improperly informed the jury of potential sentences by continually
reminding the jury that Edmonds could not receive the death
penalty.119 Presiding Justice Diaz remarked that this improperly
benefited the prosecution by allowing the jury to speculate that
Edmonds's age or circumstances could be taken into account for
sentencing purposes. 120
B. Children in an Adult System
In addition to confession issues, the court of appeals
considered several procedural and substantive implications of
trying and sentencing children in adult courts. Though the
Mississippi Supreme Court did not address these issues in its
majority review, they are worth taking into account on remand.
Indeed, the dispute between Justice Randolph's and Presiding
Justice Diaz's opinions as to whether the Youth Court Act applies
to Edmonds's confession highlights the relevance of proper
procedure when a juvenile offender is charged with a capital
crime. 121
Edmonds's capital murder charge sent him directly to adult
circuit court. 122 Since he was a child, his case could have been
transferred into youth court, though such a transfer was not
mandatory. 123 In addressing the issue of whether to try Edmonds
in adult court rather than transferring him to youth court, 124 the
court of appeals noted both that capital murder comes under the
original jurisdiction of the circuit court under Mississippi law, 125
117. Id. at (1 88), 955 So. 2d at 894.
118. Id. at (T 89), 955 So. 2d at 894.
119. Edmonds v. State, 04-CT-02081-SCT (T 68), 955 So. 2d 787, 808 (Miss.
2007) (Diaz, P.J., specially concurring).
120. Id. at (T 69), 955 So. 2d at 808.
121. See discussion supra Part II.A.
122. Edmonds, 04-KA-02081-COA ( 93), 955 So. 2d at 895.
123. Such a transfer is at the court's discretion in determining what is "in the
best interest of such child and in the interest of justice." MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-21-
159(4) (2006); see Edmonds, 04-KA-02081-COA (TT 91-94), 955 So. 2d at 894-95.
124. Edmonds, 04-KA-02081-COA (TT 91-94), 955 So. 2d at 894-95.
125. See discussion supra Part I.A.1.
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and that a circuit judge has discretion in transfer proceedings. 126
The court concluded that the trial judge had properly balanced
Edmonds's needs with the interests of justice and "found that the
interests of justice necessitated that the case stay within the
jurisdiction of the circuit court, rather than youth court."127
The court of appeals next addressed the claim that the lack of
discretion given to the trial court to consider any particular
circumstances or mitigating factors on behalf of Edmonds was
unconstitutional. 128  After a cursory review of the applicable
Mississippi law, which requires an automatic life sentence for an
adult convicted of capital murder,129 the court concluded that the
Mississippi Legislature explicitly required life sentences for
convictions of murder, without naming exceptions for defendants
"of tender years." 130  The appeals court concluded that such
legislation was constitutional, that exceptions were reserved for
youth court, and that "any other sentence would have constituted
error on the part of the circuit court, since the circuit court had no
discretion to impose a different sentence." 131
While concurring with the sentence, Presiding Judge Lee
filed a special concurrence questioning the "wisdom and justice" of
the bright line rule requiring original jurisdiction in circuit courts
for all capital murder cases. 132 Presiding Judge Lee concluded
that a change in laws would be necessary to offer youth offenders
the benefits of a shifting constitutional standard such as the one
shown in Roper v. Simmons. 133
C. Other Constitutional Errors in Edmonds
Without addressing all the procedural and substantive
questions raised in the court of appeals, the Mississippi Supreme
126. See Edmonds, 04-KA-02081-COA (T 92), 955 So. 2d at 894-95; see also
MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-21-159(4) (2006).
127. Edmonds, 04-KA-02081-COA ( 93), 955 So. 2d at 895.
128. Id. at (1 95), 955 So. 2d at 895.
129. MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-21 (2006) ("Every person who shall be convicted of
murder shall be sentenced by the court to imprisonment for life in the State
Penitentiary."); see Edmonds, 04-KA-02081-COA ( 95), 955 So. 2d at 895.
130. Edmonds, 04-KA-02081-COA ( 97), 955 So. 2d at 895.
131. Id. at (1 98), 955 So. 2d at 895.
132. Id. at ($ 123-25), 955 So. 2d at 900-01 (Lee, P.J., specially concurring)
(noting that the U.S. Supreme Court made an "encouraging" change in declaring
the death penalty unconstitutional for juveniles in Roper, departing from its prior
plurality decision in Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988), that the death





Court reversed and remanded Edmonds's case in light of several
other errors that denied Edmonds a constitutionally fair trial.134
These errors included the following: Kristi Fulgham's blanket
invocation of her Fifth Amendment privilege, which precluded an
inquiry into relevant information that could be pertinent to
Edmonds's case; 135 the refusal of the trial court to admit testimony
about the relationship between the deceased and Edmonds's half-
sister; 136 and the exclusion of a videotape which offered evidence of
Kristi's motive to murder the deceased.137 The cumulative weight
of these errors, according to the Mississippi Supreme Court,
resulted in a denial of Edmonds's right to a fundamentally fair
trial, as the only direct evidence linking Edmonds to the murder
for which he was charged came from his half-sister's allegations
and his own disputed confession. 138
I11. Missed Opportunities for Compliance with
International Law in Edmonds
With the recent Supreme Court decisions overturning the
juvenile death penalty 139 and incorporating international law as
persuasive authority, 140 the time is ripe for U.S. courts to take
international standards into account in the area of juvenile
sentencing. This Section shows how the trial court, which will
now re-try Edmonds in light of the Mississippi Supreme Court
decision, can benefit from complying with international standards
as set forth in the Civil and Political Covenant, 141 the American
Declaration, 142 and the Children's Convention. 143
A. Juvenile Confessions Should Receive Special Treatment
The overarching theme of protecting children with special
procedures that fit their special status seems especially relevant
when looking at confessions of youth offenders. Because of
psychological reasons, children are unduly influenced by authority,
and therefore their confessions are less reliable than those of
134. Edmonds v. State, 04-CT-02081-SCT ( 29-33), 955 So. 2d 787, 787 (Miss.
2007).
135. See id. at ( 13-23), 955 So. 2d at 793-97.
136. Id. at (1 32), 955 So. 2d at 787.
137. Id. at ( 24-28), 955 So. 2d at 797-98.
138. Id. at (T 29-33), 955 So. 2d at 798-99.
139. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
140. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2786 (2006).
141. Civil and Political Covenant, supra note 6.
142. American Declaration, supra note 6.




1. Voluntariness of Statements Is Suspect with
Juveniles
From his initial contact with the police, Edmonds's age was
discounted: his mother was not permitted in the room when he
confessed, 145 and the law enforcement officers did not record his
initial custodial interrogation. 146 The Edmonds appeals court,
while not completely ignoring the defense's request to view the
defendant's confession with suspicion, cited lack of judicial
authority to change the rules147 that effectively denied Edmonds
the right to have his age taken into account with regard to the
most incriminating piece of evidence against him. In his appeal,
Edmonds cited several reasons for his involuntary confession,1 48
including factors that justify the special treatment of minors in
custody situations under international law. Edmonds's confession
posed problems even for the Mississippi Supreme Court, as its
justices were split on whether or not the surrounding
circumstances rendered it inadmissible. 149 In the new trial, the
court would do well to re-examine the admissibility of Edmonds's
confession in light of several concerns.
The refusal to take Edmonds's age into account for the
admission of his confession violates Article 24(1)150 and Article
10(3)151 of the Civil and Political Covenant, both of which require
age appropriate treatment for juveniles. Both courts relied on the
suppression hearing and the fact pattern, which includes his
conversation with his mother, the videotaped confession, and two
different accounts of Tyler's interactions with Kristi.'5 2 While the
court of appeals allowed for deference to the trial court's findings
of fact (i.e., that Tyler's confession was voluntary),153 the facts also
point to problem areas in juvenile sentencing that suggest reasons
to find the confession suspect. As discussed above in Part I.A.2,
144. See supra notes 31-42 and accompanying text.
145. Edmonds v. State, 04-KA-02081-COA ($ 10), 955 So. 2d 864, 869 (Miss. Ct.
App. 2006), rev'd en banc, 2004-CT-02081-SCT, 955 So. 2d 787 (Miss. 2007).
146. Id. at (9 21), 955 So. 2d at 876.
147. Id. at ( 23), 955 So. 2d at 877.
148. Id. at ( 16), 955 So. 2d at 874.
149. See discussion supra Part H.A.
150. See Civil and Political Covenant, supra note 6, at art. 24(1).
151. See id. at art. 10(3).
152. See Edmonds v. State, 04-CT-02081-SCT (1 5), 955 So. 2d 787, 791 (Miss.
2007); Edmonds, 04-KA-02081-COA ( 17), 955 So. 2d at 875.
153. Edmonds, 04-KA-02081-COA ($ 17), 955 So. 2d at 875.
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studies suggest children have a lower ability to comprehend their
rights and their cases result in a higher likelihood of false
confessions-they are unduly influenced by the process. 154
The special protections provided to children under the Civil
and Political Covenant require legal measures that are
"appropriate to [a child's] age and legal status."'155  These
measures are required by a child's "status as a minor, on the part
of... the State."'156 The court's reliance on the signed Miranda
waiver 157 and the lack of request for an attorney or an end to the
interrogation 5 8 does not account for the possibility that Edmonds,
a child, may not have fully understood the procedures as
presented. Indeed, the fact that neither Edmonds nor his mother
was informed of the charges against him 5 9 suggests that even an
adult in Edmonds's position may not have understood the
ramifications of confessing. The very facts that indicted him in the
appellate court's eyes are those which indicate a need for the
special protections his defense requested.
2. Jury Instructions Should Reflect the Special
Circumstances of Juvenile Crime
The court of appeals twice missed an opportunity to mitigate
the trial court's blunt refusal to take Edmonds's age into account.
First, it refused to overturn the trial court's decision to deny the
defendant the opportunity to make a cautionary statement to the
jury regarding the weight of the confession on the case. 160 Second,
it refused a jury instruction regarding the possibility of a
mandatory life sentence for Edmonds. 161 The Mississippi Supreme
Court majority did not address the jury instruction issue, though
the opinion of Presiding Justice Diaz shed some light on how the
circuit court could make up for this on remand.162 The supreme
court also did not address the circuit court's reason for admitting
the confession, which rested heavily on voluntariness of the
statement and on "clear legislative intent" to deny any juvenile
154. See supra notes 31-42 and accompanying text.
155. Civil and Political Covenant, supra note 6, at art. 10(3).
156. Id. at art. 24(1).
157. Edmonds, 04-KA-02081-COA ( 17), 955 So. 2d at 875.
158. Id.
159. Edmonds v. State, 04-CT-02081-SCT ( 55), 955 So. 2d 787, 804 (Miss.
2007).
160. Edmonds, 04-KA-02081-COA (1 104), 955 So. 2d at 896-97.
161. Id. at ( 90), 955 So. 2d at 894.




prosecuted as an adult special treatment "simply because he is a
juvenile."1 63  Regarding the request for an instruction on the
possible sentence, the court of appeals argued procedural
necessity: even though jurors may have been misled into
believing that Edmonds's age could mitigate his sentence to less
than life,' 64 giving such an instruction would only incite error
because a jury does not control sentencing. 165
The reasoning behind both the lack of jury instruction as to
mandatory life sentences and the admissibility of the confession
reflects a lack of sensitivity to a juvenile's special circumstances as
shown in all three covenants' guarantees of special treatment for
juveniles.1 66 Curiously, the court of appeals noted that Edmonds's
confession would have received more suspicion had he been an
accomplice or co-defendant, but held that his young age did not
merit the same treatment. 167  As the jury bears ultimate
responsibility for convicting Edmonds of the crime, it follows that
it bears ultimate responsibility for weighing the evidence against
him. With the suspect nature of juvenile testimony, namely the
psychological and societal differences that give children in court a
reduced ability to make reasoned decisions 168  and the
magnification of the stresses on children in adult courts, 169 the
jury ought to have been alerted to the information necessary for
weighing its decisions. With the gravity of the sentence facing
Edmonds if convicted, the jury ought to have been made aware
that his age would not mitigate his sentence. This error should be
corrected on remand.
B. The Court Should Take Age into Account when Trying
and Sentencing Juveniles
In addition to taking age into account when dealing with
procedural issues of admissibility and jury instruction, courts
should pay attention to international treaties 70 and domestic
163. Edmonds, 04-KA-02081-COA ( 104), 955 So. 2d at 897.
164. Id. at ( 86-87), 955 So. 2d at 893-94.
165. Id. at ( 90), 955 So. 2d at 894.
166. See Children's Convention, supra note 6, at art. 37(a); Civil and Political
Covenant, supra note 6, at arts. 10(3), 24(1); American Declaration, supra note 6, at
art. VII.
167. Edmonds, 04-KA-02081-COA ( 104), 955 So. 2d at 896-97.
168. See AMNESTY REPORT, supra note 7, at 45-49; see also supra text
accompanying note 41.
169. See Rosenbaum, supra note 38, at 495; see also supra text accompanying
note 42.
170. See Children's Convention, supra note 6; Civil and Political Covenant,
supra note 6; American Declaration, supra note 6.
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concerns' 71 that argue for special procedures in trying and
sentencing juveniles.
1. Youth Should Be Tried in Youth Court, or Should
Be Allowed Special Procedures in Adult Court
In denying Edmonds relief from the trial court's refusal to
transfer his case to youth court, the appellate court rested its
analysis on complete deference to Mississippi laws, which make
such transfers discretionary. 172 The appellate court deferred to
the trial court's analysis in balancing Edmonds's interests with the
interests of justice but neglected to expand on what the trial court
particularly found such interests to be. 1 73 Taking international
treaty compliance into account, combined with domestic concerns
over the justice of juvenile sentencing in the United States, the
interests of justice fall in line with the interests of Edmonds.
The routine and widespread sentencing of juveniles to life
without parole 174  violates the exceptional circumstances
reservation the United States filed under the Civil and Political
Covenant 175 as well as several other provisions of the same
covenant. 176 The appellate court's reliance on existing law and
precedent prohibit it from taking into account the special
circumstance of Edmonds's age.' 77  Its holding that clear
legislative intent shows the Mississippi Legislature "has chosen to
treat juveniles as adults" 178  epitomizes the particular
circumstances of juvenile life without parole that the Human
Rights Committee finds troublesome. By not addressing
Edmonds's age, the Mississippi Supreme Court also neglected the
opportunity to comply with treaty obligations. The trial court
repeatedly refused to take account of Edmonds's age during his
trial, 179 violating Article 24(1).180 The appellate court refused to
find lack of transfer to youth court problematic, '8 ' violating Article
171. See supra Part I.
172. Edmonds, 04-KA-02081-COA (7 92-94), 955 So. 2d 864 at 894-95.
173. Id. at ($ 93), 955 So. 2d at 895.
174. See AMNESTY REPORT, supra note 7.
175. See U.S. Reservation - Civil and Political Covenant, supra note 56.
176. See supra notes 56-70 and accompanying text.
177. Edmonds, 04-KA-02081-COA ($ 19), 955 So. 2d at 875-76.
178. Id. at (7 104), 955 So. 2d at 897.
179. Id. at (7 93), 955 So. 2d at 895.
180. See Civil and Political Covenant, supra note 6, at art. 24(1) ("Every child
shall have, without any discrimination ... the right to such measures of protection
as are required by his status as a minor, on the part of his family, society and the
State.").
181. Edmonds, 04-KA-02081-COA ($ 93), 955 So. 2d at 895.
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10(3).182 Other concerns, such as the ability of an adult court to
sentence Edmonds to life without parole, are addressed below, in
Part III.B.2.
Edmonds's trial also violates due process rights guaranteed
under the American Declaration,1 8 3 which holds that for juvenile
justice, a fair trial must include 1) the opportunity for an
individualized determination by judges as well as courts and 2)
justice systems that take age into account.18 4  Mississippi's
wholesale initial transfer of all capital crimes into adult courts,
after which no individualized accounting of a defendant's age will
take place and for which life without parole is mandatory, violates
Edmonds's right to a fair trial under Article XVIII. 185 The possible
mandatory sentence violates his right to petition under Article
XXIV, 186 and the whole process violates his right to due process of
law under Article XXVI.187 These international due process
concerns mirror the domestic due process concerns regarding a
youth's reduced ability to make reasoned decisions18 and a
youth's ability to withstand the pressures he or she is faced with
under adult procedures. 189
182. Civil and Political Covenant, supra note 6, at art. 10(3) ("Juvenile offenders
shall be segregated from adults and be accorded treatment appropriate to their age
and legal status.").
183. See American Declaration, supra note 6, at art. XXVI ("Every accused
person is presumed to be innocent until proven guilty. Every person accused of an
offense has the right to be given an impartial and public hearing, and to be tried by
courts previously established in accordance with pre-existing laws, and not to
receive cruel, infamous or unusual punishment.").
184. See ACLU Petition, supra note 73, at 32.
185. See American Declaration, supra note 6, at art. XVIII ("Every person may
resort to the courts to ensure respect for his legal rights. There should likewise be
available to him a simple, brief procedure whereby the courts will protect him from
acts of authority that, to his prejudice, violate any fundamental constitutional
rights.").
186. See id. at art. XXVI ("Every person has the right to submit respectful
petitions to any competent authority, for reasons of either general or private
interest, and the right to obtain a prompt decision thereon.").
187. Id. ("Every person accused of an offense has the right to be given an
impartial and public hearing, and . . . not to receive cruel, infamous or unusual
punishment.").
188. See, e.g., AMNESTY REPORT, supra note 7, at 45 ("According to many
psychologists, adolescents are less able than adults to perceive and understand the
long-term consequences of their acts, to think autonomously instead of bending to
peer pressure or the influence of older friends and acquaintances, and to control
their emotions and act rationally instead of impulsively.").
189. See Rosenbaum, supra note 38; supra note 42 and accompanying text.
Law and Inequality
2. Automatic Life Sentences Are Unconstitutional for
Youth Offenders
The use of an automatic life sentence in juvenile sentencing,
like a lack of transfer to youth court, is problematic under
international law. Again, the Edmonds court relied on Mississippi
statutes and judicial precedent in interpreting Mississippi's
legislation to require life sentences for murder convictions, without
naming exceptions for defendants "of tender years."' 90  Edmonds
argued that this legislation unconstitutionally withheld trial court
discretion to consider particular circumstances or mitigating
factors on his behalf.19' The appellate court's conclusion that
exceptions were reserved for youth court and impermissible in
adult court 192 is contrary to other states' findings under similar
circumstances 193 and also falls within the context of the debate on
juvenile sentencing. 194 The Mississippi Supreme Court's omission
of these issues in its majority opinion suggests that, as a majority,
the justices either agreed with the appellate court's analysis or
were reluctant to take a position when other grounds for reversal
could be found.
The circuit and appellate courts' refusal to take account of
Edmonds's age in sentencing 195 violates provisions of all three
treaties relevant to this debate. It violates the Civil and Political
Covenant's guarantee of special protections for minors under
Article 24(1).196 Had the Mississippi Supreme Court upheld the
sentence of life without parole, 197 it would have violated the
requirements of special age appropriate criminal procedures for
minors under Articles 14(4) and 24(1).198 The particular harm
190. Edmonds v. State, 04-KA-02081-COA ( 97), 955 So. 2d 864, 895 (Miss. Ct.
App. 2006), rev'd en banc, 2004-CT-02081-SCT, 955 So. 2d 787 (Miss. 2007); see also
MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-21 (2006) ("Every person who shall be convicted of murder
shall be sentenced by the court to imprisonment for life in the State Penitentiary.").
191. Edmonds, 04-KA-02081-COA ( 95), 955 So. 2d at 895.
192. Id.
193. See, e.g., Naovarath v. State, 779 P.2d 944, 949 (Nev. 1989).
194. See supra Part I.A.3.
195. Edmonds, 04-KA-02081-COA ( 93-94), 955 So. 2d at 895.
196. Civil and Political Covenant, supra note 6, at art. 10(3) ("Juvenile offenders
shall be segregated from adults and be accorded treatment appropriate to their age
and legal status."); see also id. at art. 24(1) ("Every child shall have, without any
discrimination ... the right to such measures of protection as are required by his
status as a minor ... ").
197. See Edmonds v. State, 04-CT-02081-SCT (T 2), 955 So. 2d 787, 790 (Miss.
2007) (reversing the lower courts' holdings and remanding to the circuit court for "a
new trial in accordance with this opinion").
198. Civil and Political Covenant, supra note 6, at art. 14(4) ("In the case of
juvenile persons, the procedure shall be such as will take account of their age and
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caused to juveniles when they are tried, sentenced, and punished
as adults1 99 threatens the United States' compliance with multiple
articles of the American Declaration. 200 Major human rights
organizations, such as Amnesty International and the American
Civil Liberties Union ("ACLU"), have documented conditions
under which juveniles serve the sentence of life without parole,
and each has come to the conclusion that such sentences constitute
cruel, infamous, or unusual punishment. 201 The standards under
which juveniles, such as Edmonds, could be imprisoned violate
provisions against non-physical harm and cruel, infamous, and
unusual punishment-Articles I ("right to life, liberty and personal
security") and XXVI ("right .. .not to receive cruel, infamous, or
unusual punishment"). 202
In addition to the problems with the Civil and Political
Covenant and the American Declaration, Edmonds's sentence
contravenes Article 37 of the Children's Convention, which
contains a flat prohibition on sentencing children to life without
parole. 20 3  This provision would nullify Edmonds's original
sentence. As noted by the ACLU, "[p]unishing a youth offender
with the longest prison sentence possible[] offer[s] no hope of
rejoining society, little motivation of rehabilitation, and scant
opportunities for learning" 20 4 and violates all of the provisions
discussed in Part I.B.2. The circuit and appellate courts' failure to
take Edmonds's age into account 20 5 violates Article 40(1), which
requires age appropriate sentencing and promotion of
the desirability of promoting their rehabilitation."); id. at art. 24(1) ("Every child
shall have, without any discrimination as to race, colour, sex, language, religion,
national or social origin, property or birth, the right to such measures of protection
as are required by his status as a minor, on the part of his family, society and the
State.").
199. See AMNESTY REPORT, supra note 7, at 52-66.
200. See, e.g., American Declaration, supra note 6, at art. I ("Right to life, liberty
and personal security"); id. at art. VII ("Right to protection for mothers and
children"); id. at art. XVIII ("Right to a fair trial"); id. at art. XXIV ("Right of
petition"); id. at art. XXV ("Right of protection from arbitrary arrest"); id. at art.
XXVI ("Right to due process of law").
201. See, e.g., AMNESTY REPORT, supra note 7; ACLU Petition, supra note 73, at
11-20, 22-40.
202. American Declaration, supra note 6, at arts. I, XXVI.
203. Children's Convention, supra note 6, at art. 37(a) ("Neither capital
punishment nor life imprisonment without possibility of release shall be imposed
for offences committed by persons below eighteen years of age ... .
204. ACLU Petition, supra note 73, at 39.
205. See Edmonds v. State, 04-KA-02081-COA ( 93-94), 955 So. 2d 864, 895




reintegration. 20 6 The sentence of life without parole, so firmly
implanted in Mississippi law that the court saw no room for
interpretation, 20 7 violates the Article 37(a) prohibition on life
imprisonment without possibility of release for persons under
eighteen years of age and the Article 37(b) provision that
incarceration be for the shortest appropriate period of time. 208 By
overturning the appellate decision, the Mississippi Supreme Court
has given the State of Mississippi an opportunity to bring itself
into compliance with international law by upholding the rights of
children in its jurisdiction.
Conclusion
Tyler Edmonds had the misfortune of committing a crime in
a state with laws that removed his ability to draw attention to his
thirteen-year-old status during his trial and sentencing for
murder.209 His trial, conducted in adult court, and his continued
risk of a life sentence, mandated by a statutory requirement, 210
reflect the issues that characterize the debate around juvenile life
without parole. The trial, appellate, and supreme courts' refusals
to allow procedures and instructions that take account of
Edmonds's age provide classic examples of the procedures
proscribed by international treaties and constitute violations of
United States' obligations therein. Evolving moral consensus
against the practice of sentencing juveniles to life without parole
in the United States2il shows a step towards joining established
international consensus against that sentence. With the current
evolution of U.S. Supreme Court cases towards further protections
for juveniles 212 and the weight of international opinion becoming
more apparent in U.S. jurisprudence, 213 courts and legislatures
206. Children's Convention, supra note 6.
207. Edmonds, 04-KA-02081-COA (TT 118-20), 955 So. 2d at 900.
208. Children's Convention, supra note 6.
209. Edmonds, 04-KA-02081-COA ( 93-98), 955 So. 2d at 895 (affirming the
trial judge's finding that "interests of justice necessitated that the case stay within
the jurisdiction of the circuit court, rather than youth court" and rejecting
Edmonds's attempts to show age as a "mitigating factor" in sentencing).
210. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-21 (2006).
211. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 561 (2005); Atkins v. Virginia 536 U.S.
304 (2002); supra text accompanying note 36.
212. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 561; Atkins, 536 U.S. 304.
213. See, e.g., Roper, 543 U.S. at 575 (noting that "at least since the time of [the
Court's decision in Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958) (plurality opinion)] the Court
has referred to the laws of other countries and to international authorities as




should re-visit their juvenile sentencing procedures. Taking
Edmonds's age into account in the next trial would be a step in the
right direction, showing Mississippi's commitment to international
human rights and the rights of children at home.
Even if the trial court pays no attention to Edmonds's
circumstances and again sentences him to life in prison without
parole, Edmonds v. State could still have a positive effect on the
juvenile sentencing system. In light of one of the concurrences
filed at the appellate level, as well as the appellate court's
sentencing language, the Mississippi Legislature could prove an
effective forum for resolution of this problem. This special
concurrence to the original opinion, written by Presiding Judge
Lee, questioned "the wisdom and justice" in a harsh rule requiring
original jurisdiction in circuit courts for all capital murder cases,
even those of juveniles. 214 Citing Roper v. Simmons and the
evolution towards more discretion for circuit courts in the
sentencing of juveniles, Presiding Judge Lee concludes that
"without a change in our laws, this shift in the constitutional
standard offers little consolation to youthful ... offenders similarly
situated [to Edmonds]." 2 15 The court's language reflects its feeling
of being bound by legislative intent and actively cites its limits
when discussing the possibilities of allowing for special
consideration of youth offenders in adult courts. 21 6
While the Mississippi Supreme Court does not explicitly call
for legislation, Presiding Justice Diaz's concurrence provides a
strong argument for taking juveniles' circumstances into
account. 217  Presiding Justice Diaz highlights the Mississippi
Supreme Court's duty to take into account factors "unique to
children" when reviewing a juvenile's waiver of the right against
self-incrimination and the right to counsel. 21 8
The combination of opinions at each stage of Tyler Edmonds's
trial provides a solid impetus for reexamination of the juvenile
sentencing problem. The State of Mississippi would do well to
take into account recognition of an evolving standard towards
214. Edmonds, 04-KA-02081-COA ($ 123), 955 So. 2d at 900.
215. Id. at ( 125), 955 So. 2d at 901 (Lee, P.J., specially concurring) ("Recall
that in its last session, the Supreme Court determined that the death penalty for
persons under age eighteen at the time they committed the crime was
unconstitutional." (citing Roper, 543 U.S. 551 (2005))).
216. Id. at ($ 25, 95-104, 122-125), 955 So. 2d at 877, 895-97, 900-01.
217. Edmonds v. State, 04-CT-02081-SCT ( 60-64), 955 So. 2d 787, 806-07





giving trial courts more discretion in juvenile sentencing. 219 This
shifting constitutional standard may ultimately persuade the
Mississippi Legislature to re-write its juvenile sentencing laws, an
act that would recognize the differences between minors and
adults as well as children's great need for special consideration.
Equally important is the recent remand of the case back to circuit
court, which provides a second chance to set a legal precedent for
compliance with international law. Assuring Tyler Edmonds of a
fair trial, one that takes his age and surrounding circumstances
into account, would be a solid step towards further assurance of
human rights in Mississippi and in the United States.
219. See, e.g., Edmonds, 04-KA-02081-COA ( 125), 955 So. 2d at 901, (Lee, P.J.,
specially concurring) (citing Roper, 543 U.S. 551).
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